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MEDIATION IN THE WORLD OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTE 
LITIGATION: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE  
CHALLENGES FOR COUNSEL, MEDIATORS, AND  





INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT OVERVIEW 
 
Participants in commercial mediations report numerous challenges and 
concerns that reflect the professional roles they play as legal advocates, 
counselors and risk managers of litigation. For example, although attorneys 
are challenged by opposing counsel, they also confront tensions with their 
clients. Insurance claims professionals and other representatives who 
manage litigation risk for large institutions are concerned with their 
insureds’ exposure to liability, objective damages, and potential defense 
costs. Mediators perceive and respond to challenges that seem to concern 
no one else.  All the while, each participant maintains definite opinions 
regarding what others should and should not do when faced with challenges 
in the mediation. Opinions and expectations vary regarding what constitutes 
“good” mediation and how disputes should best be resolved.  
To investigate these perceptions and their implications, I undertook a 
qualitative research project examining the challenges, frustrations, and 
concerns faced by participants during the mediation of litigated commercial 
disputes. For the purposes of this study, the terms “challenges,” 
“frustrations,” and “concerns” are defined as anything that impedes the 
parties from achieving their goals in mediation—whether the parties intend 
to resolve a dispute, repair relationships, improve communication, or send 
 
*  J.D. (1998), University of Baltimore; LL.M. Candidate (2021), Pepperdine School of Law; 
Distinguished Fellow, International Academy of Mediators. The author would like to thank Peter 
Robinson, Stephanie Blondell, and Sarah Park from the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution for their 
input and guidance.  
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signals to each other concerning the litigation. While many have written 
about the mediation process in recent years, there have been few qualitative 
surveys of mediation participants. The broad, subjective nature of the 
inquiry prompted free-flowing insights from participants in my survey.   
Personal interviews were conducted of forty-three civil litigators in the 
Baltimore-Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, nineteen mediators 
(seventeen of whom are members of the International Academy of 
Mediators (IAM), which requires a minimum of four hundred commercial 
mediations for membership), and ten insurance claims professionals and 
other representatives who manage litigation risk for large institutions.  The 
interviewees were mostly individuals I knew prior to the interviews. 
Interviews were conducted in person or by telephone between July and 
November 2019. The responses are anonymized.1 
The practice of commercial mediation has aged, and it has changed—
rightly or wrongly—in response to the demands of users who pay 
handsomely for mediation services.2 This survey suggests that, with 
increasing frequency, mediators and parties do not control the process—
attorneys and insurance claims professionals do. 
What emerges from this project is a study in contrasts, similar in some 
respects to the paradox Professor Bernard Mayer describes between 
competition and cooperation.3 Participants say that they want to cooperate 
and trust each other, but they engage in competitive steps to prevent this, 
such as withholding critical information from the other side, 
overconfidently predicting their success at trial, and misleading their 
counterparts as to what will resolve the dispute. They claim to want fewer 
frustrations for themselves and, at times, their opponents when bargaining, 
but they posture and fend off meaningful moves from party opponents. 
Plaintiffs say they want meaningful responses from opponents, such as a 
“real” offer, for example, but they fail to make “real” demands, and they 
 
1.  The implications of this study should not be limited to the geographic region of Baltimore 
and Washington, D.C. Based on my conversations with claims professionals, mediators, and attorneys 
from various regions of the United States, I believe that many lawyers, mediators, and insurance claims 
professionals encounter similar challenges and frustrations with participants in their markets throughout 
the United States. See RANDALL KISER, HOW LEADING LAWYERS THINK: EXPERT INSIGHTS INTO 
JUDGMENT AND ADVOCACY 75-86, 172-201, 208-17 (2011). 
2.   Jeffrey Krivis, The Settlement Drift, MEDIATE.COM (June 2014), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/KrivisSettlementDrift.cfm [https://perma.cc/AJN3-WUZQ].  













make misleading moves in response to decent offers. Defendants say that 
they want realistic demands, but they fail to make realistic offers, and they 
take advantage of plaintiffs when decent demands are made. Lawyers 
marvel at magical, miraculous developments in mediation, but they criticize 
processes that bring them about. They want to achieve good results for 
themselves and their clients, but they do not want to invest the time and 
effort.  Mediators wish more “good” counsel existed. Lawyers wish more 
“good” mediators existed, but they are reluctant to consider mediators who 
are new to them—even if the mediator is reputable.   
Part I presents the challenges reported by attorneys and insurance 
claims professionals. Part II reviews the ways in which mediators offer 
assistance to participants. Part III explores the challenges mediators 
encounter and their responses. Finally, Part IV outlines how mediators 
frustrate attorneys and claims professionals.  
 
I. CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY ATTORNEYS AND  
INSURANCE CLAIMS PROFESSIONALS 
 
A. Mistrust of Opponents 
 
1. A Pervasive Problem 
 
Lawyers report mistrust of their opponents as a pervasive challenge; it 
is responsible for most of the frustrations discussed in this article. For 
lawyers who invest significant time and resources in managing legal or 
factual issues in a case, mistrust of opponents only increases costs. For these 
attorneys, personalities determine the tenor of mediation and its outcome. 
One lawyer said, “Tell me who is on the other side, and I’ll tell you whether 
I’ll encounter challenges and which ones are most likely to occur. That’s 
why relationships matter.”  
Although good reasons may justify some level of skepticism between 
opposing counsel, as explained in the next subsection, mistrust can 
negatively impact counsel’s ability to assess risk and bargain effectively, 
placing “attorneys in ‘untenable’ negotiation positions.”4 When attorneys 
trust each other, though, they generate better outcomes for themselves and 
 
4.  KISER, supra note 1, at 166 (2011). 
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their clients. Respondents reported experiences with trusted opposing 
counsel as less frustrating and more rewarding.5 As stated by a personal 
injury attorney, “If we know and trust counsel on the other side, they get 
better numbers from us.” 
On a broader level, facilitated in part by professional membership 
groups for the plaintiffs’ and defense bars,6 mistrust is fostered between 
advocates for injured parties and medical providers. One risk manager for a 
large hospital system asks why the plaintiffs’ bar maintains such hostility 
toward medical professionals: “Why the over-the-top competition with us? 
Doctors and nurses make sacrifices in their lives and actually want to help 
people. Not every mistake is premeditated or a cover up.” On the other hand, 
based on my experience mediating medical negligence disputes, many 
plaintiffs’ lawyers assume medical records are missing or have been altered. 
 
2. Dysfunctional, Yet Rational, Behaviors That Flow From Mistrust 
 
When opposing counsel and parties mistrust each other, a number of 
dysfunctional problems appear. Defensive or offensive tactics emerge, such 
as  
pressing arguments known to be specious, concealing 
significant information, obscuring weakness, diverting 
attention from the main evidentiary risk, misleading others 
about the existence or persuasive power of evidence not yet 
presented (experts, fact witnesses), resisting well-made, 
client-responsive suggestions, injecting hostility, 
remaining attached to positions not sincerely held, delaying 
access to information sought by other parties, and 
protracting the proceedings to wear down the other side.7  
 
5.  See also Wayne D. Brazil, Reciprocal Coaching to Reduce the Risk of False Failure in 
Mediation and Support from Social Science for Coaching Ideas, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 167, 
203 (2014) (discussing the “positive relationship” that tends to exist “between levels of trust and sharing 
information”); John Lande, Getting Good Results for Clients by Building Good Working Relationships 
with “Opposing Counsel,” 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 107, 107 (2011). 
6.  See, e.g., AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/ [https://perma.cc/NVT5-2K8P]; 
DEF. RES. INST., https://www.dri.org/ [https://perma.cc/FE58-J5TC]. 
7.  Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 
706 n.50 (2001) (quoting Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation about the Current Status and 













One dysfunctional behavior reported by lawyers with some regularity 
was withholding and hiding information, including what their clients would 
accept to settle the case. 
Lawyers and parties claim they want to negotiate openly with opponents 
who are less litigious and adversarial and more oriented toward solving the 
problem at hand, but, as indicated in the dispute resolution literature, they 
admit to withholding some information in the event a trial is necessary.8 
One senior adjuster responds to that dilemma by asking, “Why hold back 
the ‘dooms day’ fact? How else do you plan to convince me?” Unveiling 
unexpected information or evidence during mediation will not land well 
with most senior insurance adjusters. Worse, it may backfire and derail the 
process. One adjuster responds to the tactic by dismissing the evidence and 
shutting down the mediation. He says, “I give it zero weight. If that’s your 
main point we’re done for the day.” 
On the other hand, in the context of bargaining over limited resources, 
such as insurance policy proceeds, perhaps parties should not be completely 
honest with each other in all cases.9 Some mediators claim to witness overly 
competitive responses to “reasonable” demands. As they report it, “no good 
deed goes unpunished.” Important ethical issues are raised in distributive 
bargaining contexts where one party’s gain is another’s loss.10 One party’s 
“reasonable” opening position is often exploited by her opponent.11 Full and 
candid disclosure may feel altruistic, but it surrenders valuable information 
the other side wants to know.12 The needs and fears of a party “ought not     
. . . determine the price” one gets.13 For example, an “opponent has no right 
 
8.  Michael R. Hogan, Judicial Settlement Conferences: Empowering the Parties to Decide 
Through Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 429, 442 (1991) (explaining how distrust of opponents 
leads to suspicion they are acting competitively); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of 
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 782 (1984) (“Trial lawyers 
may fear releasing information in pre-trial negotiations because of the presumed loss of advantage at 
trial.”); Michael E. Dickstein, Strategy or Bad Habit? Avoiding Lawyers’ Most Common Mediation 
Pitfalls, INT’L ACAD. MEDIATORS BLOG (Oct. 26, 2018), https://iamed.org/blog/strategy-or-bad-habit-
avoiding-lawyers-most-common-mediation-pitfalls/ [https://perma.cc/HLP9-SG6H] (explaining how 
“surprises” at mediation “leave the other side feeling suspicious, betrayed, concerned about other 
information being withheld, and unwilling to make a decision at the mediation”).  
9.  See also Burns, supra note 7, at 692-93 (explaining how each side benefits by misleading 
the other).  
10.  Id.  
11.  Id. 
12.  Id.  
13.  Id. 
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to know” whether or not the other side is afraid of trial or needs to settle by 
a certain date.14 In this author’s opinion, until some degree of trust in the 
mediator and in the mediation process is established, there are sound reasons 
to conceal some information and outcome goals based on mistrust of the 
other side, especially in distributive bargaining contexts. 
 
B. Disinterest in Resolution and Lack of Authority of Attendees 
 
Almost all interviewees expect the mediation process and the mediator 
to help them resolve the dispute. Thus, lawyers are frustrated when they 
believe their opponents in mediation are not interested in a resolution.15 In 
response to being “burned” before, one plaintiffs’ attorney asks, “Why pay 
for private mediation only to offer nothing?” Another plaintiffs’ attorney 
reports that he asks the defense to make an offer before the mediation 
session.  
Some mediators are aware of the problem. As one describes, “People 
come with agendas. What’s going on? Are they really trying to settle? 
Who’s driving this?” Despite the best of intentions, however, mediation is 
sometimes used to gather information16 or send strong messages about legal 
positions.17 Even though many respondents complain about opponents who 
use mediation without an intention to settle, none of them admitted to 
employing the same tactics. Mediators cannot control the ways in which 
parties use the process, but they can try to determine how the parties may 
intend to use it before they meet, as described below.18  
Responding attorneys want opposing parties, especially insurance 
claims professionals, to appear in person with adequate authority to resolve 
the case. They expect the mediator to be a stickler on this point and hold 
accountable lawyers who appear with a surprise announcement that their 
client, or key adjuster, will be available only by phone. Even when adjusters 
appear in person, however, plaintiffs’ counsel may doubt whether the 
 
14.  Id.  
15.  See also DAVID FRANGIAMORE, HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES SETTLE CASES 7-3 (James 
Publishing 2019) (warning that some parties do not negotiate in “good faith”). 
16.  See also KISER, supra note 1, at 217 (quoting a defense lawyer complaining about misusing 
mediation to obtain added discovery and leverage plaintiffs to force lower settlements). 
17.  See also FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 1-3 (justifying mediation to convey the carrier’s 
denial of coverage). 













adjuster has adequate authority to resolve the case.19 Adjusters report that 
their carriers are interested in closing the claim file but not without knowing 
what the claimant may accept short of trial. Perhaps it is this inquiry (what 
the plaintiff will accept short of trial) that frustrates plaintiffs’ counsel and 
creates the impression, at times, that some adjusters use mediation to obtain 
additional discovery or lack adequate authority to resolve the case.  
“Serious” discussions are important, according to respondents, but what 
passes for seriousness is a matter of individual interpretation. For defense 
counsel and insurance carriers, plaintiffs seem serious about settling when 
their demands are “realistic” and when they reduce their demands over the 
course of the mediation. One senior adjuster points out, “Concessions are 
necessary; otherwise why mediate?” For plaintiffs’ counsel, carriers appear 
serious when they offer enough money to make litigation look worse than 
settlement, or as one plaintiffs’ lawyer observes, when they leverage “the 
fear that we might lose or get less at trial.” One plaintiff’s lawyer who 
specializes in medical malpractice litigation believes that serious 
negotiations do not happen often enough. In his opinion, carriers typically 
use mediation to lowball plaintiffs and “just try to settle for less than their 
authority.”  
 
C. Posturing and Overconfidence 
 
Respondents were particularly frustrated by the ways in which their 
opponents negotiate and bargain. Unreasonable demands and offers, along 
with small, incremental moves, frustrated respondents in this study and in 
others.20 Some adjustors reported that they believe that extreme bargaining 
positions can be a sign of overconfidence. They respond to blustery, 
overconfident attorneys and parties with lower offers, scheduling 
inconveniences, and legal opposition in the form of motions and procedural 
challenges. One adjuster cautions, “Drink your own Kool-Aid and you lose 
credibility in our eyes.” Adjusters see overconfidence by plaintiffs’ counsel 
as a danger that can backfire. Risk managers for a large hospital system said, 
 
19.  See also FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 1-9 (explaining carriers “usually do not give most 
adjusters enough settlement authority for many of the claims they handle”).  
20.  See also KISER, supra note 1, at 185 (reporting comments from attorneys who believe the 
most significant obstacle to resolving cases is “excessive plaintiff demands and lowball defendant 
offers”). 
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“They have more to lose than we do. We are insured and won’t go out of 
business. They have no safety net.” Because overconfidence adds time to 
the process, it can backfire, allowing unexpected misfortunes to occur. For 
example, one risk manager recalled a case where a claimant died before 
trial, a fatal blow to the case because the decedent would have been a central 
fact witness.  
Lawyers believe that it is important to maintain a high level of 
confidence in one’s case.21 Of course, practically speaking, it can be 
difficult to know when one’s own confidence is overblown, impeding one’s 
ability to assess risk. In mediation, lawyers often pretend not to be 
concerned about weaknesses in their cases,22  a tactic that challenges all 
participants. Perhaps it is no surprise that not one attorney participating in 
this study admits to being overconfident. Similarly for claims professionals, 
overconfidence can creep into the case assessments of carriers, but the 
degree to which they are aware of this heuristic may be another matter. Only 
one senior insurance adjuster admits that “internal discussions [within the 
carrier] can be an echo chamber” where few, if any, critics feel safe enough 
to express contrary valuations.  
 
D. Lack of Preparation by Opponents and the Mediator 
 
Lawyers report an expectation that their opponents will prepare for 
meaningful settlement discussions, especially when the parties engage in 
private mediation. Most plaintiffs’ attorneys believe defense counsel and 
insurance carriers are prepared when a senior adjuster appears and makes a 
decent opening offer. Defense attorneys expect plaintiffs’ counsel to know 
if applicable medical care liens can be compromised23 and are frustrated at 
mediation when this information is not available.  
Additionally, lawyers report irritations with mediators who fail to 
prepare. They expect mediators to digest pre-session materials and be 
conversant with all legal and factual issues. Some lawyers also expect 
 
21.  See also KISER, supra note 1, at 173 (quoting an attorney, who stated, “Never take a judge’s 
evaluation of your case if you believe in your case.”). 
22.  See also supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
23.  See FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 5-35, § 581.1 (explaining that most medical care 
providers assert a claim or a lien against the inured person’s settlement proceeds and that “lienholders 
will usually accept a negotiated number less than the full amount owed simply to avoid the litigation or 













mediators to anticipate problems before the day of the mediation. For 
example, when multiple parties are involved, lawyers think it is a good idea 
to start the mediation process early to address competing opinions of 
allocation. Surprisingly, given the oversaturation of mediators in most 
markets, many lawyers report that some mediators fail to prepare and appear 
disinterested in the details of cases. These mediators apparently expect the 
mediation session itself to sufficiently motivate each side to move off of 
their bargaining positions.  
 
E. Mismanagement of Client Expectations 
 
A common challenge reported by attorneys is managing client 
expectations. Although attorneys expect each other to posture during 
settlement talks, clients do not perceive the rhetoric as posturing; they take 
it at face value. As one attorney put it, “that’s why we need a good 
mediator—to help me and my clients save face.” Defense attorneys believe 
that their colleagues on the other side do not do enough to manage or 
readjust their clients’ expectations. Risk managers are skeptical of the claim 
from plaintiffs’ counsel that they “don’t have control over [their] client.”  
Even so, counsel and adjusters are frustrated by mediators who are 
unable to readjust everyone’s expectations and generate movement. Retired 
judges are commonly called into cases where the attorney hopes to readjust 
unrealistic expectations on either side.24 This is not always successful, 
because many retired judges fail to develop a broader set of skills critical to 
make mediation a meaningful process for counsel and parties.25 As one 
mediator reports, “Many attorneys are dissatisfied with retired judge 
mediators. They have no patience. They treat mediation as a courtroom. 
They don’t have fundamental mediation skills and can’t perform the basics 
such as listening, developing rapport, being creative, etc.” Another mediator 
reports, “By the time the attorneys hire a retired judge, they missed the boat. 
The attorneys failed to listen to the needs of their clients. But some people 
may need to hear from a judge. Some want a retired judge who just beat the 
shit out of participants.”  
 
24.  KISER, supra note 1, at 211-12 (listing reasons for choosing retired judges as mediators, 
including that clients respect them and lawyers think they are smart). 
25.  Id. at 212 (recounting criticisms from attorneys who believe some judges are “unfriendly, 
self-absorbed or self-important, and/or lack[ing] empathy”).  
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F. Conflicts of Interest Between Counsel and Clients 
 
Responding lawyers are frustrated by actual or perceived conflicts 
between opposing counsel and clients. Some lawyers report that although 
they may recommend settlement, their clients or carriers may not be 
interested in resolution, or may act too aggressively when negotiating a deal. 
In the eyes of some in the plaintiffs’ bar, defense lawyers are more 
accountable to carriers rather than their insured clients. Although impasse 
may be caused by a legitimate conflict between attorney and client over 
valuation, negotiation strategy, or something else related to counsel’s 
representation, the other side may perceive “bad-faith” conduct as the 
reason for impasse. Rather than consider internal conflicts of interest, 
respondents more readily assume their opponents want to create impasse or 
act in “bad faith.” For example, no respondents identified internal conflicts 
as a potential cause of impasse. Perhaps respondents maintain an attribution 
bias that some opponents are all-around bad, unreasonable and 
untrustworthy.26  
 
1. Conflicts Between Plaintiff and Counsel 
 
Some responding claims professionals are frustrated by conflicts of 
interest they perceive between plaintiffs and their lawyers. They believe that 
most injury lawyers are more interested in generating positive press and 
maximum contingency fees for themselves, rather than securing resources 
that will help clients settle and heal. Claims professionals want someone—
often the mediator—to help plaintiffs understand this conflict, but they 
recognize some lawyers prohibit such contact with their clients.27 At the 
very least, adjusters and defense counsel want to know that mediators are 
communicating offers that are based on their legal arguments and case 
evaluations. 
Many responding plaintiffs’ lawyers admit they have a problem with 
client expectations. They confess that they need to discern whether their 
clients really want a decision or a deal. They also admit that they need to 
 
26.  See also Russell B. Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory 
and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 303 (2006) (explaining attribution bias). 
27.  See also Krivis supra note 2 (reporting a similar trend in his mediation practice where a 













thoroughly explain the “best” and “worst” alternatives to trial and keep 
clients focused on their particular case, not outlier results cited by friends 
and family. Finally, plaintiffs’ attorneys recognize the need to instill 
patience in their clients and prepare them for “insulting” offers and 
impersonal “number-trading” typical of distributive bargaining. Without 
knowing it, plaintiffs’ counsel and their clients are grappling with a series 
of emotional reactions to their opponents’ behavior, along with unconscious 
cognitive challenges concerning decision-making amidst uncertainty.28 
 
2. Conflicts Between Carriers, Defense Counsel, and Insured Parties 
 
Adjusters can be frustrated by the roles that defense counsel want to 
play in mediation. One risk manager puts it this way, “We may disagree 
with our own lawyers on value and whether the case should be tried. Our 
own outside lawyers want to control too much.” Some carriers want defense 
counsel to focus on the law and litigation only and not worry about settling 
the case. As one medical malpractice defense lawyer says, “The senior 
adjuster told me, ‘I know how to settle the case. Tell me how you’re going 
to defend it.’”  
Many carriers do not disclose to their lawyers how much settlement 
authority they have, revealing some level of distrust within that relationship 
as well.29 One senior adjuster said, “I never tell my lawyer my authority. 
We coordinate and choreograph the way in which we will conduct the 
mediation [because] it’s important to speak with one voice.” 
Defense counsel report frustration when adjusters get too involved in 
the legal defense of the claim or berate them with questions such as, “What 
do you think they’ll take? Can they prove their case? What motions can we 
file?” Perceived professional shortcomings and personalities of adjusters 
can also be sources of frustration for defense counsel. According to one 
responding attorney, many adjusters do not have a legal background, do not 
observe jury trials, are expected to meet or exceed numeric goals, react 
personally to plaintiffs’ counsel and the mediator, and withhold settlement 
 
28.  Don Philbin, The Psychology of Bad Economic Decisions, 7 JAMS DISP. RESOL. ALERT 5 
(2007) (summarizing a few common ways in which parties “depart from rational decision making.”). 
See generally Korobkin, supra note 26.  
29.  See also KISER, supra note 1, at 179 (reporting comments from defense counsel that some 
carriers “do not elicit—and sometimes ignore—counsel’s evaluation and recommendation”). 
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authority if the mediator is perceived to be too cozy with plaintiffs’ 
counsel.30  
 
G. Insurance Carrier Protocols 
  
Insurance carrier protocols frustrate everyone in the mediation. In 
addition to controlling the administration of the legal defense and the 
settlement strategy, carriers control the resources that claimants want. 
Perhaps the chief frustration among respondents is battling with the carrier 
over a claim’s worth. Carriers have various ways of determining settlement 
values,31 which, according to one senior adjuster, may include “focus groups 
and mock trials.”  
Perhaps some frustration (at least from plaintiffs) stems from a lack of 
understanding of how insurance companies work. Carriers must set 
adequate reserve amounts soon after a claim is filed.32 When claims are not 
resolved before litigation begins, carriers tend to slow down the resolution 
process;33 they are in no hurry to pay money.34 The longer carriers hold onto 
their money, the more they make from interest on investments.35 Another 
factor that may determine when and how a carrier values a claim is whether 
a reinsurance contract exists to protect the “ceding,” or primary, carrier.36 If 
such a contract is in place, the primary carrier’s exposure may be a fraction 
of the plaintiff’s best trial outcome,37 providing it no incentive to bargain 
beyond a certain range.  
Even when the parties are very close to a settlement amount, carriers 
may not be willing to increase an offer. As one defense attorney reports, 
“we advise carriers on risk exposure, but senior management sets the value. 
We write reports all the time and it makes it very hard to come up with more 
 
30.  See also id. (describing counsel’s negative experience with adjusters who have an “attitude” 
or “moral outrage”). 
31.  FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 2-31, 2-32.  
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 1-9. 
34.  Id. at 2-40. 
35.  Id. at 1-3. 
36.  Id. at 4-98. 













money close to trial.” Even so, plaintiffs’ lawyers expect carriers to offer 
more money as cases get closer to trial.38 
If carriers want to settle early, they will do so. Lawyers on both sides 
report early settlements when demands and offers are “reasonable.” 
Expenses matter to carriers because litigation produces unknowable 
outcomes and defense costs.39 Still, defense costs may be less important than 
processing the claim the “right” way—even if that means paying a bit more 
in the end. As reported by one senior claims manager, settlement decisions 
need to be based on adequate information, following internal protocols.40 
She points out that senior management may not value a “good result” that 
is obtained the wrong way. She concludes that carriers may prefer to pay 
more money to resolve a case in the “right” manner, rather than save money 
in the “wrong” way because “the adjuster might not be so lucky next time.” 
 
II. WHAT MEDIATORS DO TO ASSIST PARTIES,  
ATTORNEYS, AND INSURANCE ADJUSTERS 
 
A. Advance Preparation by the Mediator 
 
Many of the mediators interviewed for this project reported that they 
engage in extensive pre-session preparation by asking questions of counsel, 
in writing or in person, such as the following:  
• What is the tenor of the relationship between counsel and client, 
insurance adjuster and plaintiff’s counsel, and between the lawyers 
on both sides?  
• Who will attend the mediation and who has authority to resolve the 
case?  
• Stated succinctly, what are the key issues from your perspective and 
from the other side’s perspective?   
 
38.  See KISER, supra note 1, at 188-89 (reporting the reluctance of plaintiffs’ attorneys to accept 
early settlements and expectation that the “longer you wait, usually the better the deal you’ll get.”). 
39.  FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 1-9. 
40.  See KISER, supra note 1, at 189 (reporting similar responses from lawyers that information 
and process is important to insurance carriers before settling a litigated claim). 
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• What are the strengths of their case and the weaknesses in yours? 
What is the risk of exposure? What is your BATNA (best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement)?41 What is their BATNA? 
• Have the parties discussed resolution or traded demands and offers?  
• Do insurance complications exist?  
• Will any party need special or unique settlement terms or special 
accommodations at the mediation?  
• What information does the mediator need to know that does not 
appear in the mediation statement?  
Most mediators realize that pre-session communication with counsel 
instills trust and confidence and enhances their credibility, as explained in 
the next section. In fact, responding attorneys confirm greater levels of 
confidence in mediators who start the process before the mediation session. 
During pre-session communications, attorneys and parties may express 
preferences for certain process options, such a joint session with an opening 
statement in the event that one side does not understand the other side’s 
position. Cases with multiple parties may need a pre-session mediation in 
order to determine allocation percentages before mediating with the 
claimants.42 
 
B. Developing Rapport and Trust 
 
The mediators interviewed for this article emphasize the importance of 
relating to people in ways that engender trust. When parties trust the 
mediator, they are likely to look to and rely on the mediator’s feedback to 
help them make difficult decisions.43 As one mediator puts it, “Trust-
building is the greatest secret ingredient and least analyzed in mediation.” 
Another successful mediator comments, “Trust is crucial to get parties to 
move. That’s why I’ll never be shadowed. I need to have intimate, private 
 
41.  ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
GIVING IN 99–108 (Bruce Patton ed., 2011) (explaining how one’s BATNA prevents the acceptance of 
terms that are unfavorable and the rejection of those that are favorable).  
42.  See STEVEN N. TAURKE JOSEPH, AM. BAR ASS’N ADR COMM., GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE 
NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN MEDIATION OF LARGE DOLLAR DISPUTES 99-101 (2011) 
(advising mediators to determine the expectations of the parties and the explaining the need to conduct 
a pre-mediation conference in some cases). 
43.  See Brazil, supra note 5, at 201 (explaining how parties often need reassurance and support 













conversations with counsel where neither one of us is thinking about a third 
person in the room.” Another mediator reports that in a private discussion, 
away from the client, he says to counsel, “I can serve you better if you level 
with me. I won’t betray you. Give me more information about where you 
want to land. Just stop posturing for a moment. Without a full deck, I can’t 
get you where you want to be.”  
IAM highlighted the critical importance of trust at its 2018 autumn 
conference. Not only do effective mediators build trust between themselves 
and participants, they also develop trust between the opposing sides.44 As 
brokers of information, mediators have to be trusted by the participants and 
counsel to perform dual roles that communicate and filter information with 
credibility.45 This can be tricky, however, because mediators are not in a 
good position to assess the trustworthiness or reliability of any of the 
participants.46 Given the adversarial nature of mediating litigated cases 
where information is guarded and bargaining positions can be deceptive, it 
may be difficult for mediators to discern which facts and figures are truthful 
and which are not.47  
Perhaps mediators should regularly revisit the basics of their early 
training, where they learned how to build trust and rapport with mediation 
participants. One mediator counsels the importance of focused, active 
listening regarding “what parties say, not on your responses.” He advises 
mediators to “maintain a real curiosity in each participant and in each case 
because it tells the participants that ‘I’m prepared and I want to learn more.’ 
That matters to the parties especially.” Other ways to establish trust include 
“being authentic,” “showing respect,” and offering a little humor.48  Asking 
“why,” and encouraging parties to “tell me more” and “walk me through it” 
demonstrate active listening, as does body language.49 
 
44.  See Int’l Acad. of Mediators, 2018 Fall Conference in Cleveland, Ohio (Oct. 4-6, 2018) 
(author’s notes of conference) (on file with the author); see also Brazil, supra note 5, at 196 (explaining 
the importance of trust-development in negotiation). 
45.  Int’l Acad. of Mediators, supra note 44. 
46.  Brazil, supra note 5, at 203-04 (stating mediators cannot know whether representations are 
truthful or not). 
47.  Int’l Acad. of Mediators, supra note 44. 
48.  See KISER supra note 1, at 212 (reporting comments such as “[e]ffective mediators have a 
sense of humor” and “they have a demeanor that makes people feel comfortable as soon as possible”). 
49.  See also Donald T. Saposnek, Style and the Family Mediator, in BRINGING PEACE INTO THE 
ROOM: HOW THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 245, 251-52 (Daniel Bowling & David Hoffman eds., 2003); cf. KENNETH CLOKE, 
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Experienced mediators know it takes time and purposeful planning and 
execution to establish trust, and it can vanish in an instant—“trust comes by 
turtle and leaves by jaguar.”50 One mediator put it this way: “I don’t expect 
them to bear their souls to me in the beginning. Trust takes time, even if 
they know me. They hold their cards close.” This mediator reports that he 
knows he has established trust when he is asked by counsel or a party, “How 
should we proceed?”  
 
C. Mediation Coaching 
 
Many responding lawyers like mediators who coach or assist them 
before or during the mediation process, and many mediators fulfill that 
role.51 Assistance and coaching occur in various ways.52 Some mediators 
help parties and counsel see themselves and their actions in a larger context 
by instructing parties to “go to the balcony” and observe the entire 
situation.53 Other mediators use visual aids and decision trees as coaching 
tools.54 Responding adjusters and lawyers expect mediators to evaluate, or 
at least interrogate, the legal aspects of the dispute to encourage them move 
off of their positions where applicable. As one adjuster said, “Don’t expect 
us to move just because it’s mediation. Give us a reason to move.” Similarly, 





MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY: THE FRONTIERS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27 (2001) (contrasting active 
listening techniques that express empathy rather than encourage honesty); Bernard Mayer, The Future 
of Mediation: Be Less Certain and More Flexible, MEDIATE.COM, 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/MayerFutures.cfm [https://perma.cc/F636-2SBF].  
50.  Int’l Acad. of Mediators, supra note 44. 
51.  See TAURKE JOSEPH, supra note 42, at 76; Brazil, supra note 5, at 176; Korobkin, supra note 
26, at 282 (suggesting potential interventions for each cognitive bias discussed); Dickstein, supra note 
8; see also DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR NEUTRALS 
AND ADVOCATES 8, 52-58 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2009). 
52.  See Brazil, supra note 5, at 168 (discussing coaching ideas and related ethical concerns); cf. 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Insights on Mediator Practices and Perceptions, DISPUTE RES. MAG., Winter 
2016, at 4 (presenting research findings that verify flexible and diverse mediation techniques employed 
by IAM mediators). 
53.  Teresa F. Frisbie, Raising Emotional Intelligence at the Mediation Table: A Recipe to Help 
Parties Tell Their Stories in Self-Distancing Language, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2018, at 21. 













1. Expressing Evaluative Opinions on the Merits of the Case 
 
Despite the long-running debate over whether mediators should express 
evaluative opinions,55 responding litigators in this study prefer strong-
willed,56 evaluative mediators who are not afraid of expressing an opinion 
about the merits of a claim or defense. One lawyer said about mediators: 
“We hired you for your insight into a case—give it to us.” Another lawyer 
urges, “Tell me something about my case I didn’t know before—that’s what 
I’m paying for.”57 As summarized by another lawyer, “Mediators who don’t 
communicate or identify risks to my positions” are not favored.  
Some responding lawyers seem to prefer mediators who express 
evaluative opinions indirectly. For example, a few respondents describe the 
techniques of a particular mediator who portrays the other side’s legal 
arguments as “crazy,” much to the glee of counsel in his caucus room. But 
after he asks a few pointed questions about their case and leaves the room, 
they report an epiphany and laugh to themselves, “Hey, he’s playing us 
too!” Says another attorney who works with this mediator, “you know what 
he’s doing, but he’s just masterful.”  
It is important to point out that in the midst of warring opinions about 
potential outcomes in court, uncertainty abounds.58 Whether an opinion is 
“accurate” is typically unknown and may matter less than the way in which 
mediators manage themselves and the process, and whether the case 
resolves.59 Evaluative mediators point out that resolution is less about the 
law and more about “how a judge or jury responds to competing evidentiary 
 
55.  See Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation through the Adoption of 
Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 479, 481 (2000); Sam 
Imperati, Ironically, Bush and Folger are Evaluative, MEDIATE.COM, 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/FuturesImperati.cfm [https://perma.cc/V469-TFV6]; Zena D. 
Zumeta, Styles of Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative, and Transformative Mediation, MEDIATE.COM, 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/zumeta.cfm [https://perma.cc/42DY-XZA].  
56.  See also KISER, supra note 1, at 216. 
57.  See also TAURKE JOSEPH, supra note 42, at 13-15 (quoting lawyers who express similar 
opinions); Korobkin, supra note 26, at 326-27 (discussing varying perspectives on the proper role of a 
mediator); Stipanowich, supra note 52, at 7 (discussing the shift in mediators’ willingness to offer 
evaluative opinions); James Allen Wall, Timothy C. Dunne & Suzanne Chan-Serafin, The Effects of 
Neutral, Evaluative, and Pressing Mediator Strategies, 29 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 127, 143 (2011) 
(reporting empirical support for assertive mediator strategies). 
58.  Brazil, supra note 5, at 203-04. 
59.  KISER, supra note 1 at 216. 
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presentations.”60 I agree with Judge Wayne Brazil, who cautions 
participants not to focus on legal outcomes too much because they obscure 
settlement opportunities.61 But one plaintiffs’ lawyer reports a compelling 
opposing view, based on his years of experience in high-stakes, complex 
litigation, that the fear of trial or summary judgment most effectively 
motivate parties to move. 
 
2. Mediator’s Role in Analysis of Case Value 
 
As reported by one IAM member, mediators may assist participants by 
drawing from their experience settling similar case types, perhaps even with 
the same set of lawyers. Some mediators, including this author, will recall 
settlement terms from similar mediations for comparison.62 When asked 
about confidentiality, this mediator explains, “I keep confidential the names 
of the parties and other identifying information, but all of the players, 
including me, know the values because we’ve settled plenty of these cases 
together.”  
Another coaching technique employed by some mediators is to help 
parties and counsel discern the meaning behind financial demands and 
offers.63 One mediator asks questions of counsel such as, “What are some 
reasonable assumptions about your number? What are you trying to say? 
How do you want the other side to interpret your position—accurately or 
not? Do you want to encourage them that a deal is possible?”  
 
3. Streamlining the Bargaining Process 
 
Mediators can help participants by streamlining the bargaining dynamic 
to make it a bit more satisfying. Although some attorneys and claims 
professionals create their own frustrations, responding lawyers want 
mediators to actively manage the bargaining process.64 Many attorneys 
 
60.  See also Brazil, supra note 5, at 203-04. 
61.  Id. at 179-80. 
62.  See TAURKE JOSEPH, supra note 42, at 70 (quoting another mediator who also negotiates on 
the basis of similar cases).  
63.  GOLANN, supra note 54, at 52-58. 













complain about how long and arduous bargaining can be.65 One reason why 
the process can be so time-consuming is that some lawyers react to their 
opponents’ moves rather than proactively execute their own strategy.66  
Beginning at the first caucus, if not earlier in a pre-session call, mediators 
can help counsel think about how their moves will affect the responses they 
may get from the other side.67 
For example, one mediator asks counsel who start from unreasonable 
bargaining positions, “Do you want to do it the fast way or the slow way? 
The slow way is to ‘bang heads.’ For example, a $28 million demand in 
response to a $400,000 offer is not meaningful if your goal is $10 million 
to $15 million. A faster way is to signal $15 million to $20 million.” Another 
mediator encourages the defense to start with a big move; he suggests that 
they offer seventy percent of their final number with the clear message that 
only a few small moves remain. He counsels the defense to ignore whether 
or not the plaintiff reciprocates. In his view, it does not matter. He reminds 
them to simply stop the process when the adjuster’s settlement authority is 
exhausted. This usually puts plaintiffs’ counsel in the position of having a 
serious client discussion regarding whether or not to accept the “last” offer.  
 
III. CHALLENGES MEDIATORS ENCOUNTER AND HOW THEY RESPOND 
 
A. Lack of Interest in the Power of the Mediation Process 
 
A number of mediators report difficult experiences with attorneys who 
attempt to control them and the mediation process. Examples of attorney 
control include prohibiting communication between mediator and client, 
asking for a “mediator’s proposal” early and often, and stalling mediation 
in hopes that the mediator’s post-session follow-up efforts might leverage 
the other side for a lower settlement.68 Many mediators believe the process 
increasingly has become lawyer-centric, elevating courtroom-style 
 
65.  See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 5, at 204-06 (advising mediators to pace concessions and delay 
discussing numbers).  
66.  See J. ANDERSON LITTLE, MAKING MONEY TALK 76 (2007) (describing how “[m]ost 
negotiators act reflexively” and “develop their next proposal in reaction to the other side’s last 
proposal”). 
67.  Id. at 77. 
68.  See also Krivis, supra note 2 (describing similar challenges).  
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advocacy and obstinacy over managing litigation risk.69 Some mediators 
believe that most lawyers do not understand how powerful and beneficial 
the mediation process can be when it otherwise permits parties to express 
what really matters to them.70  
Although some mediators may be unwilling to address these challenges 
for fear of losing future referrals from litigators,71 some mediators are 
willing to do so, encouraging their colleagues to maintain some of the 
“magic-making” capabilities of mediation in the following ways:  
• Training that helps mediators design and manage joint sessions;  
• Advise counsel about advocacy opportunities in a well-managed 
joint session and make clear, in advance, that joint sessions may 
occur at any time—not necessarily at the beginning of the process;  
• Advise counsel to reflect on how joint sessions may help them 
communicate critical information to the other side—without it 
becoming an intense, adversarial experience; and  
• Encourage judges and bar associations to advocate for and support 
party involvement in mediations.72 
 
B. Lack of Preparation by Counsel 
 
Mediators express frustration over counsel’s lack of preparation for 
mediation.73 They report mediations with lawyers who know nothing about 
their own case, let alone the other side’s case. When lawyers struggle to 
communicate with each other, mediators report that attorneys expect them 
to perform that function. Some mediators report that they run the math for 
 
69.  Id.  
70.  Eric Galton & Tracy Allen, Don’t Torch the Joint Session, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2014, 
at 25, 26. The literature on procedural justice supports this view. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
THE LAW (2d ed. 2006); Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 549, 551 (2008) (discussing the capability of alternative dispute resolution to advance party self-
determination by giving them some control over their dispute); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (explaining the importance of the “opportunity to be heard” and a 
“reasonable balance between cost and accuracy”). 
71.  Galton & Allen, supra note 70, at 27. 
72.  Id. at 28; Krivis, supra note 2.  
73.  See Krivis, supra note 2 (discussing “[t]he failure of litigators to be fully prepared to discuss, 
not argue, their cases.”). But see John Lande, Escaping from Lawyers’ Prison of Fear, 82 UMKC L. 
REV. 485, 491 (2014) (“Lawyers’ fears can lead them to enhance their performance due to increased 













parties because some lawyers simply do not analyze their case enough to be 
helpful; they fail to determine the most important costs, such as amounts 
due to healthcare providers or insurers.  
Mediators can educate counsel on how to prepare for and maximize the 
potential of the mediation process by encouraging them to exchange 
information in advance of the mediation.74 In the opinion of one mediator, 
this reduces the amount of time lawyers spend arguing over potential trial 
outcomes early in the process.75 Whereas trial predictions that occur later in 
the process are more likely to be perceived realistically. Mediators can 
engage in early exchanges of information and also prompt parties to have 
internal discussions before the session, often improving the process on the 
day of the mediation.76  
 
C. Overconfidence and Other Heuristics 
 
Many study respondents understand participants in mediation harbor 
numerous cognitive biases.77 Consequently, mediators report the need to 
assess more than the merits of the case. They observe mannerisms, such as 
eye contact, for clues as to how people are thinking and feeling. Mediators 
who help the parties manage biases more successfully help the parties make 
better decisions.78 One author recommends the “mediator’s active 
participation, active insertion of himself in the conflict, and active guidance 
of the parties toward agreement . . . [to overcome] psychological 
impediments.”79 At least one litigator agrees mediators need to “get [their] 
hands dirty in the case.” 
 
74.  See Dickstein, supra note 8.  
75.  But see George Lowenstein et al., Self-serving assessments of fairness and pretrial 
bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 159 (1993) (explaining information exchanges only matter to the 
extent they interact with pre-existing biases). 
76.  Dickstein, supra note 8. 
77.  This is consistent with previous research. See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, 
PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND 
POLICYMAKERS 267-303 (2010); DAVID A. HOFFMAN ET AL., MEDIATION: A PRACTICE GUIDE FOR 
MEDIATORS, LAWYERS, AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS (2013); PHILBIN, supra note 28; Bennett G. Picker 
& Gregg Relyea, Cognitive Barriers to Success in Mediation: Irrational Attachments to Positions and 
Other Errors of Perception That Impact Settlement Decisions, MEDIATE.COM (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/PR_CognitiveBarriers.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZH6P-7EQ5].  
78.  HOFFMAN, supra note 77, ch. 7.3.3. 
79.  KOROBKIN, supra note 26, at 327. 
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One of the most common biases in commercial mediation is attorney 
overconfidence. Mediators report that they deflate overconfidence in 
various ways. Some techniques are indirect. One mediation firm in Texas 
has “crystal balls in every conference room.” This is a subtle reminder that 
future-forecasting can be erroneous, especially in complex cases.80 Another 
mediator reports that he has developed a characteristic raised eyebrow, to 
express sufficient evaluative doubt in counsel’s position and to stymie 
overconfidence. 
Some mediators are more direct in their efforts to diminish 
overconfidence of clients and claims professionals. For example, some 
mediators ask counsel, in front of their client, to record their overconfident 
predictions in writing. This often results in the attorney backpedaling from 
the initial prediction. On the other hand, other mediators expect lawyers to 
posture in front of their clients. For that reason, some mediators will engage 
counsel in private one-on-one conversations away from clients or adjusters 
to elicit candid disclosures. 
Although lawyers want mediators to provide new insights about their 
legal positions,81 mediators often oblige but not for the reasons that counsel 
believe are important (namely, to improve counsel’s legal assessments). 
Instead, mediators express evaluative opinions to help them manage 
overconfidence and other heuristics. Some mediators suggest that 
aggressive evaluation may be the only way to overcome attorney 





80.  E.g., Dan Gardner & Philip Tetlock, What’s Wrong with Expert Predictions: Overcoming 
Our Aversion to Acknowledging Our Ignorance, CATO UNBOUND (July 11, 2011) https://www.cato-
unbound.org/2011/07/11/dan-gardner-philip-tetlock/overcoming-our-aversion-acknowledging-our-
ignorance [https://perma.cc/NB59-CFK4]. 
81.  See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
82.  KOROBKIN, supra note 26, at 298 (“Far from being an elective approach, direct evaluation 
is often necessary to overcome the overconfidence bias[.]”). 
83.  See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 1 (2005); 
Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 
(1997); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Gird 
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 9 (2003); Zena Zumeta, Facilitative Mediator Responds, A, 2000 J. 














1. Expressing Evaluative Opinions to Manage Heuristics 
 
Evaluative opinions are expressed in various ways and at various times 
in order to manage heuristics. Mediators distinguish their message 
depending on the audience, advising, “When persuading the defense, talk 
about the evidence, who will testify, and the documents; for plaintiffs, talk 
about the risks.” The content of these opinions is less important than how 
they are expressed. Mediators report that they attempt to express evaluative 
opinions in a clear and deferential manner. One mediator advises, “Never 
be the bull in a china shop with valuation.” But he also acknowledges that 
“sometimes parties need to be hit upside the head—just wrap the two-by-
four in a lot of velvet.”  
Some mediators believe that debating the issues with counsel in caucus, 
in front of the client, is effective. “It usually gets the client listening.” It may 
get counsel to listen too. Overconfidence may be overcome with difficult 
thinking prompted by the mediator, pushing parties to think harder and more 
deliberately about their assumptions.84 When information about a decision 
is difficult to process, intuition gives way to deliberation.85 
Rather than argue with counsel, some mediators ask questions such as, 
“What’s concerning you about the case? How could it go wrong? What is 
your risk of exposure?” They understand that “clients listen and respond to 
that” as well. Other mediators express opinions to counsel and in front of 
parties about litigation vulnerabilities, warning them, “I don’t want this to 
happen to you.” As one mediator puts it, openly expressing her concerns 
about the case prompts parties to say to themselves, “She’s concerned about 
me.” Remember, cautions another mediator, “[w]hat the dispute looks like 
to the attorneys is different from what it looks like to the parties.”  
For some mediators, evaluative opinions must be expressed at the right 
time. They will wait patiently for the right moment to express those 
opinions. “I’ll inform one side of the risks in order for them to re-evaluate 
their positions. It takes lots of trust. They know I’m engaged and interested. 
They want me to help. I’m patient for that to happen.”  
 
84.  BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 77, at 293; see also Robert D. Benjamin, Managing the 
Natural Energy of Conflict: Mediators, Tricksters, and the Constructive Use of Deception, in BRINGING 
PEACE INTO THE ROOM: HOW THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 109, 113-14 (Daniel Bowling & David Hoffman eds., 2003) (explaining the 
importance of leveraging “dissonance in thinking” so that parties can consider other views). 
85.  BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 77, at 293. 
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Rather than earn the parties’ trust before expressing an opinion, one 
mediator sees it the other way around: trust comes as a byproduct of 
evaluation. He builds trust and confidence because he expresses evaluative 
opinions. But he cautions, “How hard you push depends on attorney and 
client. Be careful with plaintiffs in cases that will be decided by juries. 
Acknowledge good points but ask, ‘What if it doesn’t happen?’ Remind 
them that other evidence goes against it.” Some mediators emphasize the 
perils of jury decisions by explaining to parties, “Juries decide based on who 
they like. Do you usually trust people you’ve never met before?” Some 
mediators say, “I’m being honest with you. I could be on your jury.”  
 
D. Lack of Negotiation Strategy 
 
Mediators report that too many lawyers fail to develop or adhere to a 
negotiation plan during the mediation.86 These mediators observe strategies 
that are limited to reacting to the other side’s bargaining moves and trial 
outcome predictions.  To address this problem, one mediator tries to avoid 
that dynamic in his joint sessions where counsel is likely to say something 
like, “We’re going to crush you like a bug. Now let’s make a deal.” Instead, 
this mediator will query counsel: 
Why start with that? We’re wasting time. You’re asking 
them to respond to your worst points and a position you 
don’t really maintain. You will accept some percentage of 
their demand or will pay some number north of your offer. 
It antagonizes them and makes it harder to get a deal. 
Some mediators coach counsel by suggesting bargaining moves 
throughout the process.87 Other mediators predict how the bargaining will 
likely unfold based on prior experiences with the lawyers or the case type.88 
Similarly, insurance claims professionals likely prepare their own 
bargaining strategies in advance of the mediation, anticipating how much 
each side will move throughout the process. One defense attorney describes 
 
86.  See also LITTLE, supra note 66, at 77 (“The crux of the problem is that most negotiators 
never get past case analysis to develop any plan for movement during the negotiation.”); Dickstein, 
supra note 8 (listing a number of “bad habits” that many lawyers mistake for strategy including the 
failure to understand the “first offer is a message”).  
87.  See also LITTLE supra note 66, at 111-120; GOLANN supra note 54, at 52-62. 
88.  See, e.g., LITTLE supra note 66, at 239-61 (charting bargaining rounds in court-ordered 













the habits of a particular adjuster who routinely develops bargaining plans 
for each mediation, ignoring the reactions and threats of plaintiff’s counsel. 
According to this lawyer, the adjuster obtains terrific results, case after 
case.89  
According to one mediator, a sense of timing—when to convey 
information, when to recommend moves, or when to convene certain 
conversations, etc.—may be the most difficult thing to teach mediators, yet 
is critical to a successful mediation. He adds, “closing is a timing issue.” 
Some mediators report that they routinely manipulate the timing of moves 
in order to avoid early impasse that would otherwise be virtually assured.90 
“The right move at the wrong time can kill progress,” as one mediator puts 
it. Mediators who seem to possess a keen sense of timing advise that 
“awareness is key. Your idea may be a good one. But is it good right now?”  
 
E. Control of the Mediation 
 
Some participants intend to control or “game” the mediation process.91 
Although a number of mediators report that fewer cases are settling on the 
day of mediation, closure may be better timed after the mediation. As one 
mediator says, “People in significant cases need time to think about what 
happened in mediation before they’re ready to make the next move. For 
example, future surgery may need to be considered before more authority is 
granted.” Perhaps parties need time to consider their options from a practical 
perspective, or they may need time to construct a “hero story.”92 In other 
 
89.  See also TAURKE JOSEPH, supra note 42, at 69 (describing the benefits of developing a pre-
planned bargaining strategy in mediation). 
90.  See also Benjamin, supra note 84, at 122 (explaining how mediators need time to “set the 
scene and prepare the participants so that the resolution . . . appears to be of their own design”). 
91.  A thorough discussion about the ethics of lying in settlement negotiations is outside the 
scope of this article. Nonetheless, some authors acknowledge that lying “works” in some mediation 
circumstances. See Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1272 
(1990) (“[W]e might admit that, in a wide range of circumstances, lying works.”); Robert Benjamin, 
Cloaked Negotiation: Necessary Back-Channel, Under the Table and Surreptitious Strategies and 
Techniques to Make Deals Work, MEDIATE.COM (Jan. 9, 2009), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/benjamin43.cfm [https://perma.cc/PH49-53PT] (explaining the 
utility of “cloaked negotiation strategies” to counteract “the loss of face” and reactive devaluation); John 
Cooley, Defining the Ethical Limits of Acceptable Deception in Mediation, MEDIATE.COM (Dec. 2000), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/cooley1.cfm [https://perma.cc/XR2Y-LTMB] (“[W]hatever 
truthfulness standard is adopted, it must accommodate, or at least acknowledge, the concept of the ‘noble 
lie.’”).  
92.  A term this author heard used for the first time by a mediator who practices in Texas.  
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words, parties need to get the approval of others—professionally or 
psychologically—in order to save face with others and themselves.93  
 
F. Not Responding to Frustrations and Challenges 
 
Some senior mediators have reached a point in their careers that they do 
not care what lawyers think of them. Ironically, perhaps for that reason, 
these mediators continue to get plenty of referrals because they are not 
afraid of holding back “the truth” as they see it. One of these mediators 
remarked, “I don’t have patience for those who ignore the obvious. Those 
who don’t want to talk about facts don’t use me.” This view aligns with 
other advice given by mediators “to be bold” and “don’t worry if the lawyers 
will call you back.” 
 
IV. HOW MEDIATORS FRUSTRATE ATTORNEYS AND ADJUSTERS 
 
A. What Counsel and Claims Professionals Expect From Mediators 
 
One way to understand how mediators frustrate attorneys and adjusters 
is to appreciate how they do not. Although there may be a wide variety of 
opinions regarding how attorneys think mediators should conduct the 
process, attorneys report good mediators are “trusted,” “listen well,”94 
possess “great people skills,” and “get results.”95  
No doubt, all mediators are not equal. In the opinion of many attorneys, 
there are wide disparities among mediators in terms of their ability to deliver 
the kinds of services sought by many lawyers and claims professionals.96 
Lawyers and adjusters are frustrated by mediators they perceive to be weak, 
 
93.  See Ellen Kandell, Methods of Saving Face in Conflict, ALT. RESOLS., LLC. (Dec. 5, 2018) 
https://www.alternativeresolutions.net/2018/12/05/methods-of-saving-face-in-conflict/ 
[https://perma.cc/U95E-3H2J]; Greg Stone, Preparing for Mediation: A Practical Guide to Saving Face, 
MEDIATE.COM (Apr. 2013), https://www.mediate.com/articles/StoneG2.cfm [https://perma.cc/P3JK-
HFYP]. 
94.  See KISER, supra note 1, at 211-12 (reporting similar results). 
95.  See FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 7-15 (affirming the ability of “good” mediators to 
distill the case down to a few significant points). 
96.  See id. at 7A-3; Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys’ Discussion and Use of ADR, 19 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 459, 485 (2004) (finding more than a third of attorneys in a study believed 













take too much time caucusing with their opponents, unable to convey their 
message, or simply fail to generate movement.  
 
B. Failure to Connect with Participants 
 
Many lawyers report frustration with mediators who have little to no 
ability to connect with parties and express empathy, or who appear 
detached, uncaring, or disengaged. Lawyers and claims professionals know 
how important it is for parties (injured parties in particular) to feel connected 
to an empathetic mediator.97 Defense lawyers and adjusters want the 
mediator to develop a trusting relationship with plaintiffs.  
Unfortunately, this enthusiasm may not be altruistic. In competitive 
bargaining dynamics, participants could use anything to gain leverage—
which includes building rapport and trust between a mediator and a party. 
It is conceivable that the mediator’s ability (or perceived inability) to 
connect with a party may not be at issue; instead the mediator may be 
protecting a party from manipulation or exploitation. Plaintiffs’ counsel 
may try to preclude mediator-client contact for this reason.98 
 
C. Misapplying Facilitative and Transformative Techniques 
 
Many litigators in the study express a disdain for facilitative or 
transformative techniques,99 a view that may be more prevalent in 
commercial litigation.100 One such lawyer complained, “Don’t try to make 
us get along in injury cases. That’s the wrong way.” In the opinion of many 
 
97.  See also FRANGIAMORE, supra note 15, at 7-4 (discussing empathy as a “valuable 
negotiation tool”); A. IRVIN SCHEIN, MINDEN GROSS LLP, THE ROLE OF ANGER IN MEDIATION 13 
(2013), https://mindengross.com/docs/default-source/publications/the-role-of-anger-in-mediation 
[https://perma.cc/Z8Z5-X85Q] (identifying empathy as a “tool employed by successful mediators”). 
98.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
99.  See Zumeta, supra note 55 (summarizing facilitative mediators as those who do not 
recommend settlement terms or predict legal outcomes and transformative mediators empower parties 
to recognize each other’s “needs, interests, values, and points of view.”); Leonard L. Riskin, 
Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 17 (1996) (describing a continuum of mediation styles or practice orientations that 
“facilitate” the parties’ negotiation and evaluate “matters that are important to the mediation”). 
100.  See Julie MacFarlane, Culture Change—A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-
Connected Mediation, 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 241, 244-45; see also Burns, supra note 7, at 706-16 
(discussing why transformative mediation is incompatible with client autonomy and the role of a 
litigator). 
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litigators interviewed for this project, facilitation and transformative 
techniques are not perceived to be “strong” enough to move parties off of 
their positions. Most lawyers interviewed for this project prefer separate 
caucuses, akin to settlement conferences, with short, meet-and greet style 
joint sessions. Expressing this view, one lawyer reiterated, “Don’t make us 
go through an adversarial joint session. My client and I will dig in.”  
But, successful mediators must possess a diverse set of skills that will 
help parties achieve their outcome goals.101 Flexibility and adaptability are 
critical in this regard.102 As stated by one author, “a mediator who limits his 
involvement to pure facilitation reduces the number of tools at his disposal 
that can help the disputants to identify and agree on a set of settlement 
terms[.]”103 Similarly, the mediator who only uses evaluative techniques 
works with limited tools.  
 
D. Lack of Fortitude and Creativity 
 
As mentioned earlier, responding lawyers in the study express 
frustration about mediators who appear “weak,” unable to generate 
movement, or are indifferent to closing the case.104 Respondents express a 
desire for mediators who are both creative problem-solvers and who are in 
control—especially when it comes to badly-behaved participants and 
“bully” attorneys.105 Other comments from respondents include the 
following: “Don’t be a paper airplane who simply shuffles numbers back 
and forth.” “Don’t stick to the same process over and over again.”106  
 
E. Evaluative Opinions 
 
Respondents report that evaluative opinions of mediators can frustrate 
counsel who believe strongly in their case and know their strengths and 
 
101.  John Bickerman, Giving Mediation Clients What They Want, NAT’L L. J. (Nov. 14, 2009, 
12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202435438370/giving-mediation-clients-
what-they-want/ [https://perma.cc/NAG6-DS2R]. 
102.  Id.  
103.  Korobkin, supra note 26, at 327.  
104.  See supra Section IV.A. 
105.  See also TAURKE JOSEPH, supra note 42, at 113 (reporting similar results). 
106.  See also Stipanowich, supra note 52, at 6 (describing diverse and flexible practice techniques 













weaknesses.107 It is easy to counter-argue or simply reject the mediator’s 
evaluation since there is wide discretion regarding the admission and weight 
of evidence and interpretation of law.108 Most lawyers and claims 
professionals report that they do not like evaluative opinions that bully their 
side into concessions. “Don’t tell me how doom-and-gloom my position is 
all the time.” Counsel and claims professionals want mediators to evaluate 
the other side’s case with equal force and skepticism. Some claims 
professionals grow frustrated and may perceive mediator bias when it 
appears that the discussion is consistently “pro-plaintiff.”  
 
F. Mismanagement of Information 
 
Responding adjusters and lawyers also express frustration with 
mediators who withhold information or keep participants “in the dark” 
during the mediation process, especially if other parties settle out of the 
case. They request, “Don’t deny me information during the process. Tell me 
what’s happening in the other rooms. Check in with me at least every now 
and again.” Without feedback, one senior adjuster wonders, “Is my message 
getting through to the other side?” 
 
G. Premature Termination of the Process 
 
Lawyers participating in this study do not want to work with mediators 
who give up too soon. Some mediators report the need to be “dogged” and 
“tenacious” in resolving disputes. But others with decades of experience are 
not as steadfast, claiming, “You can’t want a settlement more than the 
parties do.” Although attorneys say that they want mediators to work very 
hard to settle the case, they also do not want their time wasted. This creates 
some tension for mediators to continue working despite strong signs of 
impasse. When should they stop? How do they know when the impasse 
cannot be broken? No one really knows how long the mediator should 
persevere. The only person who has sufficient information to decide when 
to quit is the mediator. The perception of wasted time can make the mediator 
 
107.  KISER, supra note 1, at 173-74. 
108.  But see id. (discussing attorneys who put greater weight on the evaluative opinions of judges 
in settlement conferences). 
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look bad. “Any ineffective use of my time is bad,” said one construction 
adjuster. Attorneys surveyed have said the same.  
 
H. Failure to Coordinate Logistics 
 
One risk manager made clear her need to have adequate time and space 
to get into the right frame of mind for the mediation. She counsels mediators 
to “think through and organize the logistics. Make it easy for me to know 
where I go, where to put my coat, allow me time to use the restroom and get 
a cup of coffee, tell me what time lunch will be served, etc.”109 This is not 
to say that claims professionals deserve special treatment—even though 
they have the resources that can resolve disputes. Each participant has an 
important role to play. Mediators should think about how each participant 
will transition from their travels to the mediation and forget about other 




Unfortunately, the typical mediation of a litigated commercial dispute 
is often limited to an aggressive battle over whose trial prediction is more 
credible than the other’s. Many lawyers seem to be unaware of other 
methods of persuasion and influence, and fail to realize that posturing over 
possible trial outcomes is not as persuasive as a proposal that makes 
litigation look too risky for their opponent. Parties usually respond 
favorably to reasonable settlement proposals because they permit each party 
to reflect on their risk tolerance and put a quantifiable value to time and cost 
savings, whereas litigation outcome predictions do not.110 Moreover, 
claimants and defendants are attracted to the certainty that comes with 
settlement.111 
To the extent that mediators are frustrated by these developments, let 
this “study in contrasts” serve as a recipe that can reconstitute mediation’s 
“secret sauce.” As common as it is for lawyers in mediation to focus on trial-
 
109.  See also Grant Hill, Don’t Make Major Decisions on an Empty Stomach, SCIENCEDAILY 
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/09/190916103811.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H2Z9-7A47]. 
110.  See TAURKE JOSEPH, supra note 42, at 77. 














like advocacy, posture over legal outcomes, and “game” the process, so too 
should it be common for mediators to move participants toward a more 
sophisticated view of conflict and resolution.112 “There is no cookbook 
formula”113 that can integrate or transform the polarities of the parties’ 
positions.114 If nothing else, mediators can return to simple, direct 
techniques that expand a party’s understanding of the situation, highlight 
underlying interests, and illuminate potential options.115 The work is 
difficult, but the effort is essential.116 
Although respondents express numerous complaints about each other, 
few recommend changes to the mediation process itself, or a reduction or 
elimination of its use. The general consensus is that when compared to 
litigation and adjudication, mediation’s potential for delivering efficient and 
satisfying outcomes cannot yet be beat. Recall, however, this was also the 
promise of arbitration.117 As lawyers exerted more influence over the 
arbitration process, it too devolved into something more akin to courtroom 
litigation, but with fewer rights of appeal.118  Although lawyers like to 
mediate,  they are likely to continue hiring mediators who can function 
within a legal paradigm. On the one hand, the future looks bright—lawyers 
need mediators and parties need mediation. On the other hand, the challenge 
for mediators is to resist watering down the “secret sauce” in order to cook 









112.  MAYER, supra note 3, at 17.  
113.  See supra notes 101-03, 106, and accompanying text.  
114.  MAYER, supra note 3, at 17, 271 (quoting KENNETH CLOKE, THE DANCE OF OPPOSITES: 
EXPLORATIONS IN MEDIATION, DIALOGUE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION SYSTEMS DESIGN 355 (2013)) 
(observing that “dialectics” can transform “polarity into unity”). 
115.  MAYER, supra note 3, at 43-44. 
116.  Id. at 271-72.  
117.  Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 22. 
118.  Id.; Sylvia Hsieh, Arbitration Falling Out of Vogue, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION 
& RESOL. (Mar. 10, 2008), https://www.cpradr.org/news-publications/articles/2008-03-10-arbitration-
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS ASKED OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDY 
 
Questions Asked of Attorneys 
 
1. Deciding whether mediation is a good choice for a particular case 
a. What are the most important factors in case evaluation?  
b. How do you assess the risks of a litigated outcome? 
  
2. What do you consider when determining whether a particular mediator is 
a good fit for a particular case? 
a. Do different types of cases suggest different types of mediators?  
c. What makes a good or bad mediator? 
d. How do you negotiate with opposing counsel regarding mediator 
choice (i.e., when do you defer, when do you push)? 
e. Do insurance companies play a large role in selecting the mediator?  
f. Do mediators contact you before the session? If so, what do they do?  
g. What are some examples of effective techniques you’ve seen 
mediators employ?  
 
3. What kinds of concerns do clients have regarding mediation? 
 
4. When is the right time to mediate? How much information do you need?  
Are there exceptions (i.e., when is early mediation worthwhile)? 
 
5. What are your common challenges and frustrations? 
a. How do you respond?  
b. How do you manage your client’s reactions to their frustrations? 
c. How do you wish your opponents responded to your frustrations?  
d. How do you interpret overly inflated demands and lowball offers in 
mediation?  
 
6. How do you persuade others in mediation? How have you been 
persuaded?  
 
7. What do you value most in mediation (e.g., process, outcome)? 
 














9. Do you allow your client to speak to the mediator? Why or why not? 
 
10. Do you believe there is a tension between the roles of zealous advocate 
and counselor who manages risk? If so, please comment as to how you 
manage this tension when negotiating or mediating.  
 
11. Defense attorneys: How do carriers settle cases? What do you wish they 
would do differently and why? 
 
Questions Asked of Mediators 
 
1. What are common challenges you face in mediation and how do you 
manage these? 
 
2. What challenges do you believe participants face? 
 
3. How do you get participants to move off of these challenges?  
a. What are your most effective techniques? 
b. When do you pursue these techniques (e.g., early, middle, late, post-
session)? 
c. Why might you not be successful in this regard?  
 
4. How do you build trust and confidence with the parties?  
a. How much time do you take?  
b. How do you work with difficult personalities?  
 
5. How do you stage and manage difficult conversations? 
 
6. What are the most challenging circumstances you encounter in your 
mediation practice (i.e., your most difficult moments of persuading one side 
or another)? How do you respond? 
 
7. What advice would you offer attorneys, parties, and carriers in mediation?  
 
8. In what ways do you believe you are different than other mediators? 
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9. What causes most non-settlements? 
 
10. What have you learned that you think is important to pass on to other 
aspiring mediators?  
 
Questions Asked of Claims Professionals 
 
1. What are common or unique challenges you face in mediation?  
a. How do you respond to these challenges?  
 
2. How do you handle the differences in case evaluation you may have 
compared to evaluations made by your superiors or outside counsel? 
 
3. Are you concerned that you may become overconfident in your own 
position?  
a. If so, what do you do about it? 
b. Have you overpaid a claim because you were overconfident of the 
legal outcome? 
 
4. How do you use data to determine case value?  
a. Do you use comparative data on a regular basis?  
b. How do you assess elements of a case that differ from those in the 
data set? 
 
5. How do you determine whether a case is a good candidate for mediation?  
a. When is the right time?  
 
6. How do you believe you are most persuasive to the other side and the 
mediator?  
a. How do you get the other side to move?  
 
7. Do you structure post-session talks if the case does not settle?  
a. If so, how? 
b. Should the mediator? 















8. What makes for good or bad mediation?  
a. Is the outcome (i.e., the resolution) more important than the process 
(i.e., the manner in which the mediation is conducted)? 
b. Do you prefer mediators who will “bang heads” to settle, mediators 
who possess interpersonal skills, or mediators who employ a blended 
process?  
c. Should the mediator possess subject-matter expertise? Or does this 
not matter as long as the other side is moving off of their position?  
d. Is status important (i.e., do you prefer retired-judge mediators)?
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